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Abstract
Radio-frequency (RF) signals enabled wireless information and power transfer (WIPT) is a cost-
effective technique to achieve two-way communications and at the same time provide energy supplies
for low-power wireless devices. However, the information transmission in WIPT is vulnerable to the
eavesdropping by the energy receivers (ERs). To achieve secrecy communications with information
nodes (INs) while satisfying the energy transfer requirement of ERs, an efficient solution is to exploit a
dual use of the energy signals also as useful interference or artificial noise (AN) to interfere with the ERs,
thus preventing against their potential information eavesdropping. Towards this end, this article provides
an overview on the joint design of energy and information signals to achieve energy-efficient and secure
WIPT under various practical setups, including simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
(SWIPT), wireless powered cooperative relaying and jamming, and wireless powered communication
networks (WPCN). We also present some research directions that are worth pursuing in the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
Future wireless networks are expected to constitute billions of low-power wireless devices
(such as sensor nodes, radio frequency (RF) identification (RFID) tags and Internet-of-things
(IoT) devices) for diversified applications, and it is crucial to provide them with satisfactory
communication quality of service (QoS), guaranteed data security, and sustainable energy supply.
RF signals enabled wireless information and power transfer (WIPT) has been recently recognized
as a promising technique to achieve two-way communications and provide cost-effective energy
supplies for low-power wireless devices at the same time [1], [2]. In general, there are mainly two
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Fig. 1. An example of SWIPT, where the information sent to INs in the downlink is vulnerable to be eavesdropped by ERs.
types of applications for WIPT, namely simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
(SWIPT) and wireless powered communication networks (WPCN), as shown in Figs. 1 and 2,
respectively. In SWIPT, hybrid access point (H-AP) simultaneously broadcasts information and
energy signals to communicate with information nodes (INs) and power energy receivers (ERs)
in the downlink; while in WPCN, H-AP broadcasts energy signals to power both ERs and INs
in the downlink, and INs use the harvested energy to transmit information back to H-AP in the
uplink [2].
Despite the technology advancements, WIPT systems face new data security challenges, since
the information transmission of the INs (in both downlink and uplink) is vulnerable to be
intercepted by the ERs that are untrusted and can be potential eavesdroppers [3]. In SWIPT
systems, ERs are normally located much closer to the H-AP than INs due to their different
requirement of receiver power sensitivity (e.g., −10dBm for energy harvesting versus −60dBm
for information reception) [4]. Due to this “near-far” effect, untrusted ERs can easily overhear
and eavesdrop the downlink information intended to INs. In WPCN, both ERs and INs are
located close to the H-AP to harvest the RF energy in the downlink. Therefore, INs’ transmitted
information in the uplink is easy to be eavesdropped by nearby untrusted ERs.
Physical-layer security has been recognized as a promising technique to secure wireless
communications against malicious eavesdropping attacks. The objective of physical-layer se-
curity is to maximize the secrecy rate of a communication channel, which corresponds to the
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Fig. 2. An example of WPCN, where the information transmission of INs in the uplink is easy to be overheard by nearby ERs.
achievable data rate of this channel provided that the eavesdropper cannot intercept or decode any
information. In the literature, there are various approaches that have been proposed to improve
the secrecy rate. Among them, the artificial noise (AN) (see, e.g., [5]) and cooperative jamming
(see, e.g., [6]) based designs are appealing, where properly designed AN or jamming signals
are transmitted by the transmitter itself (together with the confidential message) and by the
external helping nodes (HNs), respectively, for the purpose of interfering with the malicious
eavesdroppers to improve the secrecy rate.
In this article, we integrate the physical-layer security in WIPT to overcome the challenging
information leakage problem due to ER eavesdroppers. Such secure WIPT systems aim to achieve
two-way secrecy communications with INs while satisfying the energy harvesting requirements at
ERs. We present an efficient solution by exploiting a dual use of the energy signals in WIPT, for
not only energy transfer, but also as useful interference or AN to jam ERs against their potential
information eavesdropping. With such consideration, we provide an overview on the joint design
of information and energy signals under various practical system setups, by investigating two
types of IN receivers (namely, Type-I and Type-II IN receivers) that can or cannot cancel the
energy signals (or AN) before decoding the information, respectively. It is assumed that the
H-AP accurately knows the channel state information (CSI) to the receivers. The outline of this
article is given as follows.
• First, we consider AN-aided secrecy SWIPT systems. We show that when there is only
a single antenna at the H-AP, due to the “near-far” effect, secrecy communications are
4only feasible for Type-I IN receivers with AN cancelation employed. On the other hand,
when there are multiple antennas at the H-AP, a joint beamforming design of information
and energy signals can help achieving secrecy communications while ensuring the energy
harvesting requirements, for both Type-I and Type-II IN receivers.
• Next, we consider the secrecy SWIPT with wireless powered cooperative relaying and
jamming to improve secrecy communication performance. In this approach, trusted idle
ERs in the system are enabled as external HNs, which can use the harvested energy from
the H-AP to help relay information to the intended IN receivers and jam the untrusted ER
eavesdroppers in the downlink, with a joint design of both information and energy signals.
• Furthermore, we also address the secrecy WPCN with downlink energy transfer and uplink
secrecy communications. In this case, wireless powered cooperative jamming is used to
exploit trusted ERs as HNs to help for interfering with the uplink eavesdropping of suspi-
cious ERs. It is crucial to efficiently schedule these trusted ERs with joint downlink energy
transfer and uplink jamming design, in order to optimize the uplink secrecy communication
performance. However, this problem has not been addressed before, to the authors’ best
knowledge.
Along with the above discussions, we also point out some promising directions for future work
in both secrecy SWIPT and secrecy WPCN. Finally, we conclude this article.
II. SECRECY COMMUNICATION IN SWIPT: AN ARTIFICIAL NOISE APPROACH
In this section, we consider the downlink secrecy SWIPT as shown in Fig. 1, where a single
H-AP serves multiple INs and ERs at the same time, by sending them either information or
energy. In the following, we focus on a special setup with one single-antenna IN and one single-
antenna ER to draw essential insight, in which two cases with single-antenna and multi-antenna
H-AP are considered.
A. The Case with Single-Antenna H-AP
To start with, we consider the simplest case with one single-antenna H-AP serving one single-
antenna IN and one single-antenna ER. For the purpose of illustration, let hI and hE denote
the channel power gains from the H-AP to the IN and the ER, respectively, where hI < hE
holds to be consistent with their “near-far” locations. Also, let s0 (with unit power) denote the
confidential information signal to be sent to the IN, and P denote the transmit power of the
5H-AP. Conventionally, the H-AP transmits with only information signal (which also conveys RF
energy), by setting the transmit signal as
√
Ps0. In this case, the amount of power harvested at
the ER is ηhEP , where 0 < η ≤ 1 denotes the energy conversion efficiency at the ER. As for
the secrecy communication to IN, the received signal power at the (far) IN (i.e., hIP ) is always
weaker than that at the (near) ER (i.e., hEP ). In this case, any information decodable at the IN
can always be decoded or eavesdropped by the ER. Therefore, transmitting solely information
signals is infeasible to achieve secrecy communication in the single-antenna SWIPT setup.
To overcome this security problem caused by the “near-far” issue, it is crucial to employ an AN
approach by additionally sending a dedicated energy signal or AN to jam the ER eavesdropper;
furthermore, we need to enable the IN receiver to pre-cancel the AN before decoding the
information (as will be shown in detail later), in order to achieve non-zero secrecy rate. In
the AN approach, the H-AP splits the transmit power P into two components, with a fraction of
(1−α) to send the information signal s0 for the IN and the remaining fraction of α to send the
dedicated energy signal or AN (denoted by s1 with unit power) for the ER, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
denotes the transmit power splitting ratio. In this case, the transmitted baseband signal at the
H-AP is expressed as x =
√
P (1− α)s0+
√
Pαs1. Accordingly, the amount of power harvested
at the ER is ηP (1−α)hE+ηPαhE = ηPhE, which is regardless of the transmit power splitting
ratio α. As for the secrecy communication, we consider two types of IN receivers (namely Type-I
and Type-II IN receivers), which can and cannot cancel the AN before decoding the information
signal, respectively. In order to enable Type-I IN receiver to perform AN cancellation, it needs
to know the AN used at the H-AP a priori, based on a practical physical-layer key distribution
method described as follows [7]. First, both the H-AP and the IN should pre-store a sufficiently
large ensemble of sequences that are used as the seeds to generate Gaussian distributed AN, and
the index of each sequence in the ensemble is regarded as a “key”. Then, the H-AP randomly
picks up one sequence and transmits its index confidentially to the IN before data transmission.
Accordingly, the H-AP is able to generate a random AN signal that is only known to the IN but
unknown at the ER. This is due to the fact that without the knowledge of the employed key and
given a very large key set, the ER cannot decode the AN even with a long-term observation,
since the complexity is practically too large and thus infeasible. With the AN known at both the
H-AP and the IN, the AN cancellation is thus implementable at the Type-I IN receiver.
Under the Type-I and Type-II IN receivers, the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios
(SINRs) are expressed as γ
(I)
I
= P (1−α)hI
σ2
and γ
(II)
I
= P (1−α)hI
PαhI+σ2
, respectively, and the SINR at the
6ER eavesdropper is given as γE =
P (1−α)hE
PαhE+σ2
, where σ2 denotes the noise power at the receivers of
both the IN and the ER. By assuming that s0 and s1 are independent Gaussian random variables,
the achievable secrecy rate at the Type-i IN receiver is expressed as [5]
R(i)
s
=
[
log2
(
1 + γ
(i)
I
)
− log2 (1 + γE)
]+
, (1)
where i ∈ {I, II} and [x]+ = max{x, 0}. The achievable secrecy rate R(i)s is a non-concave
function with respect to the transmit power splitting ratio α. To maximize R
(i)
s , we can adopt a
one-dimensional search over 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
To illustrate the necessity of the AN approach and the AN cancellation at the (Type-I) IN,
we conduct simulations to compare the performance of the two AN approaches with Type-I and
Type-II IN receivers, versus the conventional approach without AN. The results are shown in
Fig. 3. In the conventional approach, the achievable secrecy rate corresponds to R
(I)
s or R
(II)
s
in (1) with α = 0. In this simulation, the distances from the H-AP to the IN and the ER are
dI = 20 meters (m) and dE = 2m, respectively, the path loss exponent is assumed to be 3, and
the noise power is −80dBm. Under this setup with “near-far” deployment, we have hI < hE .
Note that in all schemes, the harvested powers at the ER are identical, and thus are not shown.
The left subfigure of Fig. 3 shows the maximum secrecy rate versus the transmit power P . It is
observed that the secrecy rates of the conventional approach without AN and the AN approach
with Type-II IN receiver are always zero. This is due to the fact that as hI < hE , we have
γ
(II)
I
< γE irrespective of the transmit power splitting ratio α. As a result, for both schemes,
the received SINR at the IN receiver is always smaller than that at the ER eavesdropper, and
hence, the secrecy rate is always zero. By contrast, it is observed that the secrecy rate achieved
by the AN approach with Type-I IN receiver is strictly positive and monotonically increasing
with the transmit power. This result is expected, and shows that under the singe-antenna H-AP
case, the AN approach is only beneficial in improving the secrecy rate when AN cancellation
(i.e., Type-I IN receiver) is employed, due to the “near-far” deployment. The right subfigure of
Fig. 3 shows the optimal transmit power splitting ratio α in the AN approach with Type-II IN
receiver versus the transmit power P . It is observed that the optimal α converges to about 0.5
as transmit power increases, i.e., the transmit power is equally split to the information signal
and the energy/AN signal. This is because when the transmit power P goes to infinity, we can
approximate the secrecy rate as R
(I)
s → log2
(
P (1−α)hI
σ2
)
− log2
(
1 + 1−α
α
)
= log2
(
P (1−α)αhI
σ2
)
,
for which the maximum is attained when α = 0.5.
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Fig. 3. Secrecy rates versus the transmit power at the H-AP in a SWIPT system with a single-antenna H-AP.
In the literature, the benefit of using AN at the H-AP and employing AN cancelation at the IN
has been further exploited under other system setups. For example, the authors in [7] considered
fading channels, where the H-AP adaptively adjusts the power assigned for information and AN
signals over different fading states to optimally exploit the channel dynamics for improving the
average secrecy rate. Furthermore, the authors in [8] investigated a more general orthogonal
frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA) scenario with multiple INs and ERs, where all
other receivers (i.e., ERs and other INs) are potential eavesdroppers for each IN. In [8], the
H-AP adds independent AN over each sub-carrier and only the intended IN at that sub-carrier
can a-priori know the corresponding key to cancel the AN before decoding its information.
B. The Case with Multi-Antenna H-AP
Multi-antenna beamforming has been recognized as an efficient technique to improve both
communication rates and energy transfer efficiency in SWIPT [9], by steering RF signals towards
targeted INs/ERs with focused information and/or energy beams. Similarly, we can exploit the
8benefit of multi-antenna H-AP in secrecy SWIPT systems. Suppose that there are N > 1 antennas
at the H-AP, and denote the N × 1 channel vectors from the H-AP to the IN and the ER as hI
and hE , respectively. Let wI and wE denote the N×1 unit-norm transmit beamforming vectors
at the H-AP for the information signal and the energy signal (or AN), respectively. Under the
Type-I and Type-II IN receivers, the received SINRs are re-expressed as γ
(I)
I
= P (1−α)|h
H
I wI |
2
σ2
and γ
(II)
I
= P (1−α)|h
H
I wI |
2
Pα|h
H
I wE |
2+σ2
, respectively, and the SINR at the ER eavesdropper is given as
γE =
P (1−α)|h
H
EwI |
2
Pα|h
H
EwE |
2+σ2
, where the superscript H denotes the conjugate transpose of a vector.
Then, the achievable secrecy rate at the Type-i IN receiver, i ∈ {I, II}, is given by R(i)s in (1)
by substituting the newly defined SINRs.
Consider first the conventional design without AN, for which the achievable secrecy rate
corresponds to R
(I)
s or R
(II)
s with α = 0. In this case, a positive secrecy rate is achievable if the
H-AP transmits the information beam wI lying in the null space of the channel vector hE to
the ER. This is in sharp contrast to the case with single-antenna H-AP, where the secrecy rate
is always zero without AN employed. As a result, we expect that by additionally exploiting the
gain provided by the AN approach, both the secrecy rate and energy transfer efficiency can be
further improved via proper information and energy/AN beamforming design.
In general, the design of information and energy/AN beams critically depends on the types
of IN receiver, and obtaining the optimal beamformers corresponds to solving complicated
optimization problems. Instead of considering the optimal solution, we adopt the following
intuitive designs to draw insights. The H-AP first sets the information beam wI following the
maximum-ratio transmission (MRT) principle based on the channel vector hI to the IN, and then
designs the energy/AN beamforming vectorwE depending on the type of IN receiver considered.
When Type-I IN receiver is used with the AN cancellation, the H-AP designs the energy/AN
beam wE following the MRT principle based on the channel vector hE to the ER, so as to
maximally transfer energy and also maximally degrade the ER’s received SINR. When Type-
II IN receiver is considered without AN cancellation, the energy beam wE should be designed
based on a zero-forcing (ZF) principle to lie in the null space of the IN’s channel vector hE , so as
to avoid the interference to the IN receiver. By exploiting the spatial degrees of freedom brought
by the multiple antennas at the H-AP, positive secrecy rates are achievable for both types of IN
receiver, which is different from the case with a single-antenna H-AP, where positive secrecy
rate is achievable only for Type-I IN receiver.
9To compare the performances of the AN approach under Type-I and Type-II IN receivers, Fig.
4 provides a numerical example to show the secrecy rate at the IN versus the harvested power
at the ER, where the system parameters are set same as those in the case with single-antenna
H-AP, except that the number of transmit antennas at the H-AP is N = 4 with the directions
from the H-AP to the IN and the ER are specifically set as 0 and 60 degrees, respectively.
For comparison, we also consider the conventional design without AN, in which the H-AP can
either transmit over the ER channel’s null space to achieve secrecy communication to the IN but
without any energy delivered to the ER, or use the MRT beamforming to the ER for maximizing
its harvested energy but without any confidential information conveyed. We use time-sharing
between the two strategies to achieve both positive secrecy rate and positive harvested energy in
general. From Fig. 4, it is observed that both the conventional design without AN and the AN
approach with Type-II receiver achieve positive secrecy rates, which is different from the case
with single-antenna H-AP in Fig. 3, where the secrecy rate is always zero. This is obtained by
properly designing the information and energy/AN beamforming to exploit the additional spatial
degrees of freedom. Furthermore, it is observed that the AN approach with Type-I IN receiver
achieves the best performance in terms of both secrecy rate and harvested power, thanks to the
exploitation of both the cancelation of AN and the beamforming gain.
In the literature, the authors in [4] and [10] considered multi-antenna secrecy SWIPT systems
with one “far” IN as well as multiple “near” ER eavesdroppers, by considering Type-II and
Type-I IN receivers, respectively, where information and energy/AN beamforming vectors are
jointly determined following the similar design principle above. For future work, how to extend
the design for secrecy SWIPT to the case with multiple INs each with one or more antennas
is still an open problem, which, however, is challenging to solve. On one hand, with multiple
INs, the H-AP in general needs to design multiple transmit information beams to different INs,
in order to properly control the inter-user interference among them, in addition to ensuring the
secrecy performance. On the other hand, the use of multi-antennas at both the H-AP and INs
leads to matrix optimization problems that are more difficult to solve than the above example
problem with vector variables only.
III. SECRECY SWIPT WITH WIRELESS POWERED COOPERATIVE RELAYING AND JAMMING
This section considers another appealing solution named wireless powered cooperative relaying
and jamming to improve the secrecy rate of IN in secrecy SWIPT systems. In future, practical
10
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Fig. 4. The secrecy rate at the IN versus the harvested power at the ER for the secrecy SWIPT system in the case with
multi-antenna HAP.
wireless networks will constitute numerous low-power wireless devices, and as a result, it is
practical that during the IN’s communication, some trusted and idle ERs are located between the
H-AP and INs. This motivates the idea of wireless powered cooperative relaying and jamming to
improve the performance of secrecy SWIPT, where these trusted ERs are enabled as friendly HNs
in both relaying the information from the H-AP to the IN, and sending AN to cooperatively jam
the untrusted ER eavesdroppers. As these HNs are of low power, to avoid their energy waste,
their individual energy consumption for relaying and jamming should be no larger than that
harvested from the H-AP.
In particular, an example secrecy SWIPT system with wireless powered cooperative relaying
and jamming is shown in Fig. 5(a), which can be implemented based on the “harvest-then-relay-
and-jam” protocol consisting of two time slots: in the first slot, the H-AP sends confidential
information signals to both INs and HNs, and transmits energy/AN signals to charge HNs and
ERs as well as interfere with ER eavesdroppers at the same time; in the second slot, HNs use the
11
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Fig. 5. Secrecy SWIPT system with wireless-powered cooperative relaying and jamming: (a) System model; (b) Operation at
each wireless-powered helping node (HN).
harvested energy to relay information to INs, where AN signals are also sent to defend against
the ERs’ eavesdropping.
In order to harvest energy as well as relay information and jam with AN, the HNs should
adopt new transceiver architectures, an example of which is shown in Fig. 5(b), operating as
follows. In the first time slot, the HN uses a receive power splitter to split its received RF signal
into two parts, one with a fraction of power γ for harvesting the energy to be used in the second
12
time slot and the other with the remaining portion of power 1− γ for receiving the information
to be relayed. In the second slot, the harvested energy at the HN is further split into two parts
by a ratio 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, with a portion of β used for generating AN to jam ER eavesdroppers and
the other portion 1 − β for relaying the received information. Specifically, in a particular time
instant, each HN can adjust its operation among the following modes by adjusting the receive
and transmit power splitting ratios γ and β.
• Harvest-then-jam: The HN uses all its harvested energy to jam ER eavesdroppers by setting
transmit and receive power splitting ratios as β = 1 and γ = 1, respectively.
• Harvest-then-relay: The HN uses all its harvested energy to relay confidential information
by setting β = 0 and 0 < γ < 1.
• Harvest-then-relay-and-jam: The HN uses its harvested energy for dual purposes of relaying
and jamming by setting 0 < γ < 1 and 0 < β < 1.
For example, intuitively, when the HN is near ER eavesdroppers but far from the INs (e.g.,
HN1 in Fig. 5(a)), it may choose to operate in the harvest-then-jam mode; when the HN is
near INs but far from ER eavesdroppers (e.g., HN2 in Fig. 5(a)), it may work in the harvest-
then-relay mode; when the HN is near both (e.g., HN3 in Fig. 5(a)), it can work in the general
harvest-then-relay-and-jam mode.
Furthermore, when the HN needs to relay confidential information (i.e., with 0 < β < 1 and
0 ≤ γ < 1), it can choose its relaying protocol between amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-
and-forward (DF), depending on whether the key (for AN design) is known a-priori at the HN
or not (i.e., Type-I or Type-II receiver of HN). Intuitively, when the key is known a-priori, at the
receiver side HNs can cancel the AN from the H-AP for more efficient DF confidential message
relaying; furthermore, at the transmitter side, different HNs can coordinate their respective AN
signal design to achieve beamforming (so-called coordinated beamforming), such that the AN
will be coherently combined at the ER eavesdroppers for more efficient jamming. In this case,
a significantly improved secrecy communication performance would be achieved, which is at
the cost of more implementation complexity, due to the requirement of key sharing (for AN
cancellation) from the H-AP to HNs, as well as the decoding processing for extracting the AN
at each individual HN. Instead, when the HNs do not know the key (for AN design) a-priori,
it is generally desirable to use AF relaying to avoid the decoding operation at HNs. This also
prevents HNs from overhearing the confidential information.
To optimize the performance of the secrecy SWIPT with wireless powered cooperative re-
13
laying and jamming, it is crucial to perform a network-wide optimization to determine the
operation mode and relaying protocol of different HNs, jointly with their transmit and receive
power splitting ratios, as well as the transmit power allocation/beamforming for information
and energy/AN signals at both the H-AP and HNs. Such an optimization is also dependent
on the types of receivers at the HNs/INs and subject to the energy harvesting constraints at
HNs (i.e., the relaying and jamming energy consumption cannot exceed the harvested energy).
Due to the above issues, the performance optimization for the secrecy SWIPT with wireless
powered cooperative relaying and jamming is a difficult problem to solve, and even developing
a general problem formulation is a challenging task. Instead of addressing the general scenario,
in the literature there have been several works [11]–[14] considering various specific setups. For
example, the authors in [11], [12] considered the case with wireless powered AF relaying, where
the ER eavesdroppers can only overhear the confidential information relaying from HNs in the
second time slot. The optimal AF relaying processing and AN beamforming at HNs are jointly
designed to maximize the sum secrecy rate. In [13], [14], the authors considered the case with
only wireless powered jamming, where the H-AP first powers the HN and then the HN jams
the eavesdropper by using the harvested power.
Despite the above progress, the extension to more general setups still requires substantial
future work. For example, in practice ER eavesdroppers that are not far away from both the
H-AP and HN may be able to combine the signals overhead from both hops to degrade the
system’s secrecy performance, thus making the secrecy design more challenging. Moreover, the
multiple wireless-powered HNs may operate in different modes as aforementioned, i.e., harvest,
relay, and/or jam. How to select their optimal modes under general setups are also challenging
problems unsolved.
IV. SECRECY COMMUNICATION IN WPCN
Besides secrecy SWIPT, another important application of WIPT is secrecy WPCN as shown
in Fig. 2, where INs use the harvested energy from the H-AP to send confidential information
back to the H-AP, in the presence of untrusted ER eavesdroppers. To the best of our knowledge,
how to improve the secrecy communication performance for WPCN has not been addressed in
the literature yet.
Similar as the conventional WPCN without security consideration in [15], the secrecy WPCN
can be generally implemented in a “harvest-then-transmit” protocol, where the transmission is
14
divided into two time slots: one for wireless energy transfer from the H-AP to a set of INs as
well as ERs, and the other for confidential messages transmission from the INs back to the H-AP.
In this case, the uplink information can be easily eavesdropped because untrusted ERs (potential
eavesdroppers) may be located near the H-AP for energy harvesting. To improve the secrecy rate
from INs to the H-AP via defending against untrusted ERs’ eavesdropping, an efficient solution is
to employ wireless powered cooperative jamming similarly as in the previous section, in which
trusted idle ERs in the network are employed as friendly HNs to jam untrusted ERs’ uplink
eavesdropping (instead of downlink eavesdropping in the previous section).
Specifically, as HNs are not aware of the INs’ transmitted confidential information messages,
they will operate in the harvest-then-jam mode to interfere with the untrusted ER eavesdroppers,
with β = 1 and γ = 1 in Fig. 5(b). In order for more efficient jamming, different HNs should
share the same key for AN design, such that they can use coordinated beamforming to maximize
the jamming power to ER eavesdroppers. This also simplifies the AN cancellation at the H-
AP, as only one key is used. Furthermore, the maximization of uplink secrecy rates requires a
joint scheduling for the downlink wireless energy transfer of the H-AP, the uplink information
transmission of the INs, and the uplink jamming of the HNs, subject to the energy harvesting
constraints at both the INs and HNs. For instance, allocating a longer time slot for wireless
energy transfer can lead to higher transmit power of INs and higher jamming power of HNs,
but this in turn reduces the time for confidential message transmissions from HNs to the H-AP.
An efficient time allocation between the two slots is thus crucial.
The other issue faced in the secrecy WPCN system is the so-called “doubly near-far” problem,
where “far” INs (i.e., INs far away from the H-AP) would harvest less wireless energy in the
downlink but needs more transmit power in the uplink to achieve the same communication rate
as “near” INs. Furthermore, due to the limited available power at far INs, far INs are more
vulnerable to be eavesdropped by ERs than near INs. To tackle the “doubly near-far” problem in
secrecy WPCN, it is efficient to enable nearby HNs to help relaying the confidential information
to the H-AP. In order to implement such a wireless powered cooperative relaying and jamming
in secrecy WPCN, one additional time slot for information relaying is required. In this case, the
HN can be implemented based on the structure in Fig. 5(b) as follows: in the first time slot,
the HN sets the receiver power splitting ratio to be γ = 1 for harvesting the wireless energy;
in the second time slot, the HN sets γ = 0 for receiving the confidential information from far
INs; and in the third time slot, the HN splits its transmit power into two parts for information
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relaying and sending AN, respectively. A more sophisticated time allocation among the three
slots together with the joint downlink and uplink scheduling is necessary to fully reap the gain
of wireless powered cooperative relaying and jamming in this case.
In addition, backscatter WPCN has recently emerged as a new type of WPCN by leveraging the
technique of backscatter communications, where a wireless device without active RF components
can reflect back (rather than actively radiate) the RF signals received from the H-AP for the
purpose of communications. Here, the reflected signals are modulated via the device by properly
controlling the mismatch between the antenna and load impedance. While most existing works
focused on using the reflected signals for delivering information, how to use such signals as AN
for jamming to improve the secrecy performance, or even use them for dual goals of AN and
information signal at the same time is an interesting topic that has not been addressed yet.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article provided a new perspective in improving the secrecy communication performance
in emerging WIPT systems while ensuring the energy transfer requirements, which exploits a
dual use of energy signals as useful interference or AN to combat against potential eavesdropping
by untrusted ERs. In particular, we discussed three secrecy WIPT setups, namely, SWIPT,
wireless powered cooperative relaying and jamming, and WPCN, respectively. For each setup,
we presented the joint information and energy/AN signals design by considering two types of
IN receivers that can or cannot cancel the energy/AN signals. We also discussed the design
challenges and some future research directions. Furthermore, there are other interesting issues
that are unaddressed in this article due to space limitation, which are briefly discussed in the
following.
The implementation of the secrecy WIPT requires the H-AP to accurately know the channel
state information (CSI) to both INs and ERs, which is practically a difficult task, especially
for the CSI to untrusted ER eavesdroppers. For the purpose of initial investigation, this article
assumes that the ER eavesdroppers are existing energy users in the network, and thus they are
willing to cooperate in helping the H-AP obtain their CSI, for the purpose of facilitating the
energy transfer. However, if the ER eavesdroppers intend to eavesdrop information rather than
receiving energy, then it is difficult for the H-AP to acquire their actual CSI. How to design the
secrecy WIPT in this case is thus more challenging.
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Furthermore, the proposed AN approach with Type-I IN receiver relies on the assumption
that the keys for generating the AN can be shared secretly between the secrecy transmitters and
receivers. In practice, the secrecy keys may be overheard by ER eavesdroppers. In this case,
how to achieve secrecy WIPT with only partially secure key exchange is another challenging
open problem.
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